Volilci in interesne skupine

Image via Wikipedia

V elektronski knjigi “A Beginner’s Guide to Liberty”, ki ga je izdal Adam Smith Institute, (adamsmith.org), je v šestem poglavju “Why government fails” avtorjev Petra J. Boettkeja and Douglasa B. Rogersa zanimiv opis vpliva interesnih skupin na politike. Priporočamo v branje.

Voters and interest groups

Politicians can usefully be looked at as election seeking entrepreneurs. By definition a politician wants to get votes and money to pay for his campaign. If he is unable to obtain these votes and contributions, he will not get elected.

If an election is coming, politicians will try to gain voters’ support. To do this, they will concentrate benefits in the short run and spread the costs over the long run. For example, they may increase government spending on popular projects before an election, even if it means raising taxes in the long term.

Politicians also know that many people don’t bother voting and that a lot of voters do not think it is worth taking the time to learn much about political issues. In contrast to these unorganised groups, there are special interest voters who know and care a lot about a particular issue.

Politicians know they will gain little by focusing their efforts on the ill-informed mass of voters and those that don’t vote at all. They will benefit most from concentrating benefits on well-organised and well-informed special interest groups, while spreading costs on everyone else.

We have thus identified two sources of political failure – the short-sighted bias of politicians and the concentration of benefits on special interest groups at the expense of the wider public. But it gets worse.

These special interest groups will often use substantial resources to try to get their favoured policies passed. They may spend large amounts of time and money trying to influence politicians. This is called ‘rent seeking’. They will also try to make sure that they control any government regulation of their own behaviour. This is often referred to as the ‘capture theory’ of regulation.

Such interest group lobbying for special favours is what economists call a deadweight loss. Overall it produces no value; it expends resources simply to take resources away from others.

Če se vam zdi, da je katerikoli del besedila povezan s 3. razvojno osjo, klikni “Podpiram”.